Monitoring payments for watershed services schemes in developing countries by Ina, Porras et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Monitoring payments for watershed
services schemes in developing countries
Porras Ina and Alyward Bruce and Dengel Jeff
IIED
March 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47185/
MPRA Paper No. 47185, posted 24. May 2013 22:45 UTC
Monitoring payments 
for watershed services 
schemes in developing 
countries
Sustainable Markets
Ina Porras, Bruce Aylward and Jeff Dengel
www.iied.org
 
2013
This paper was produced by IIED’s Sustainable Markets Group. The Sustainable Markets Group
drives IIED’s efforts to ensure that markets contribute to positive social, environmental and economic
outcomes. The group brings together IIED’s work on market governance, business models, market 
failure, consumption, investment and the economics of climate change. 
Published by IIED, 2013
Citation: Porras, I., Alyward, B. and Dengel, J. 2013. Monitoring payments for watershed services 
schemes in developing countries, IIED, London
Front cover © Ina Porras
Sustainable Markets Group
International Institute for Environment and Development
80–86 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8NH, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 3463 7399
Fax: +44 (0)20 3514 9055
email: info@iied.org
www.iied.org
ISBN: 978-1-84369-903-3 
This publication can be downloaded from http://pubs.iied.org/16525IIED.html
© International Institute for Environment and Development 2013
All rights reserved
Monitoring payments for  
watershed services schemes in 
developing countries
 Ina Porras, Bruce Aylward and Jeff Dengel
Payments for watershed services (PWS) are schemes that use funds from water users (including 
governments) as an incentive for landholders to improve their land management practices. They are 
increasingly seen as a viable policy alternative to watershed management issues, and a means of 
addressing chronic problems such as declining water flows, deteriorating water quality and flooding. 
In some places, local governments, donor agencies and NGOs are actively trying to upscale and 
replicate PWS schemes across the area. While their apparent success and progress in launching 
new initiatives is encouraging, there is still much to be learned from formative experiences in this 
field, especially with regard to monitoring and evaluation.
In this paper  we discuss the monitoring and evaluation criteria behind compliance or transactional 
monitoring, which ensures that contracts are followed, and effectiveness conditionality, which looks 
at how schemes manage to achieve their environmental objectives regardless of the degree of 
compliance. Although the two are usually linked, a high degree of compliance does not necessarily 
ensure that a scheme is effective. This is because a poorly designed scheme may target the wrong 
land managers and land that is at least risk, meaning that payments do not generate the desired 
hydro-ecological or conservation benefits. As the levering capacity to demand payments for better 
watershed management increases, so does the need to understand the dynamics of such activities 
and demonstrate their impacts. While the growing interest in such schemes shows that participants 
believe in the principle of land management, evidence of their impact is needed to determine which 
initiatives genuinely add value and are worth pursuing. 
Keywords: Payments for watershed services; environmental impacts; monitoring and evaluation; 
land use; low- and middle-income countries. 
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1. IntroDuctIon
Box 1. Economic benefits of watershed protection
The keen interest in PWS schemes can be ascribed to their economic impacts and the way that they affect water filtration and 
purification, regulate seasonal flows, control erosion and sediment and preserve habitats. While scientists such as Bruijnzeel 
(2004b) and Calder (2005) highlight their capacity to regulate relatively intact soils, they also generate spiritual and other 
benefits unrelated to land and water use.
The proportion of natural forests is often seen as an indicator of a watershed’s health (Kaimowitz, 2004). Indeed, economic 
analysis from the United States shows an inverse relationship between average treatment costs and forest cover, with 
the former declining as the latter increases (Postel and Thompson, 2005). However, exotic tree species with high water 
requirements reduce water flows: it is estimated that alien tree species in South Africa would account for more than 2,720 
million m³ of water or 16 per cent of total registered water use if left unchecked (Turpie et al., 2008). 
Other ecosystems like wetlands and páramos (alpine tundra ecosystems) naturally absorb, clean and release water flows 
to major cities in South America, meaning that they have little need for purification apart from chlorine (Buytaert et al., 2006; 
Crespo et al., 2009). Highly degraded slopes increase siltation and turbidity, while compaction and poor cover reduce the 
soil’s ability to infiltrate water, increasing losses through evaporation and the risk of flash floods. Farm-level management 
plans have been successful in controlling non-point source pollution from agriculture in New York (Appleton, 2002); and a 
combination of mixed cropping, terracing and agro-forestry have been suggested as feasible techniques that will enable small-
scale farmers to retain moisture for rain-fed crops in the Upper Tana in Kenya. It is estimated that this would cost between 
US$2 million and US$20 million per year, and generate possible benefits of between US$12million and US$95 million (IFAD, 
2012). 
1. Introduction
Sustainable land and water management can provide multiple 
environmental services (including watershed services) by 
conserving existing natural ecosystems, managing agricultural 
and agroforestry land, and restoring degraded ecosystems. 
These efforts are often driven by a range of instruments, 
from direct regulation through prohibitions and zoning, ‘soft’ 
approaches such as information and capacity building, 
market-based instruments such as taxes and fines, and 
hybrid approaches that use regulatory authorities and market 
mechanisms such as cap-and-trade measures.
The use of payment for ecosystems services (PES) to 
promote sound ecosystem and watershed management 
is an idea that has moved from economic theory to policy 
debate and finally into practice over the last 30 years or so. 
In watersheds, economic incentives are used to promote 
upstream land management practices that are expected to 
help protect or improve the quantity and quality of water 
downstream. Like carbon taxes or carbon cap and trade 
schemes that ‘put a price’ on carbon, these payment for 
watershed service (PWS) schemes aim to incorporate the 
externalities of land use into land managers’ production 
processes in order to achieve greater economic efficiency. 
PWS schemes are increasingly regarded as a viable policy 
alternative for resolving watershed management problems. In 
some places local governments, donor agencies and NGOs 
are actively trying to upscale and replicate PWS schemes 
across the area. 
1.1 The problem, objectives and 
methodology  
The problem. Actions associated with payment for 
watershed services must constitute a change in past or future 
behaviour and practices. They only generate real ‘additional’ 
benefits if they secure actions that would not have happened 
if the payment had not been made. The greatest difficulty 
in monitoring PWS schemes is knowing with any certainty 
what would have happened without them, since the PWS 
scheme is all that can be observed and measured (Ferraro 
and Pattanayak, 2006). While some regard this as a major 
issue in biodiversity conservation, it also applies to any kind 
of incentive that seeks to influence future behaviour. Such 
actions are inherently uncertain, but nonetheless necessary.   
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Table 1. Examples of land practices that include target watershed services
Promoted land use Ecosystem service Example
Conservation and 
protection of existing 
ecosystems
Bundled •	 In	Costa	Rica	most	PES	is	allocated	per	hectare	of	land	protected	each	
year (Porras, 2010; Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007). In 2012, a set of criteria 
for allocating contracts for protection assigned extra points and increased 
payments by 25 per cent in water protection areas. 
•	 A	compensation	programme	in	Finland	offers	incentives	to	create	new	nature	
reserves that provide habitats for threatened species or protect areas of 
great natural beauty (Tikka, 2003).
•	 Voluntary	forest	conservation	contracts	in	Norway	(Barton,	2010;	Skjeggedal	
et al., 2010).
•	 Swedish	nature	conservation	agreements	(Naturvårdsavtal)	are	normally	
signed for 50 years (EEA, 2010; Mayer and Tikka, 2006). 
•	 The	Austrian	Natural	Forest	Reserve	Programme	(launched	in	1995)	
compensates farmers for not harvesting over a period of 20 years.
Agricultural practices 
aimed at providing 
environmental 
services and on-site 
economic returns for 
farmers
Usually biodiversity 
and water
•	 Silvo-pastoral	projects	in	Colombia,	Nicaragua	and	Costa	Rica	(Casasola	et 
al., 2009; Ibrahim et al., 2010; Montagnini and Finney, 2010). 
•	 Organic	agriculture	in	Costa	Rica:	National	Electricity	Institute	(ICE)	Project	
in La Angostura Dam. 
•	 Agroforestry	contracts	in	the	PSA	Programme	in	Costa	Rica,	Sumberjaya	in	
Indonesia, and Jesus de Otoro in Honduras.
•	 Best	management	contracts	in	the	Catskill-Delaware	Watershed	in	New	
York.
•	 Most	European	countries	use	subsidies	co-financed	by	the	EU	Common	
Agricultural Policy (CAP) to fund the conservation of agricultural ecosystems, 
such	as	the	High	Nature	Value	areas	promoted	in	Europe	(EEA,	2010).	
Reforestation for 
commercial purposes 
(medium- to long-
term schemes with 
timber as main 
objective)
Usually carbon but 
also for watershed 
protection
•	 Six	national	PES	schemes	and	approximately	11	small	local	watershed	
schemes promote reforestation (Porras et al., 2008).
•	 Community	reforestation	contracts	through	Plan	Vivo	in	Mexico,	Uganda,	
Mozambique and other countries (www.planvivo.org). 
•	 REDD	projects	(Bond	et al., 2009).
Rehabilitation 
of degraded 
ecosystems for 
protection
Biodiversity and 
water
•	 Removal	of	alien	tree	species,	Working	for	Water	in	South	Africa.	
•	 PCJ	in	Brazil	to	restore	riparian	forests	(Porras	et al., 2008).
Source: Porras et al. (2011). For many other examples see: Baylis et al. (2008); Ferraro (2009); Landell-Mills and Porras 
(2002); Porras et al. (2008); TEEB (2011); Waage and Steward (2007); and Wätzold et al.(2010).
The objective. The objective of this paper is to take stock of 
how we understand the monitoring and evaluation of PWS 
schemes. We argue that the environmental performance of 
PWS schemes is best assessed in terms of their conditionality 
and additionality, and by focusing on the issue of monitoring 
and evaluation we hope to stimulate activity in this area and 
ultimately help improve the design and implementation of 
future programmes.
Methodology. The apparent success and progress made 
in launching new PWS schemes should not distract us from 
the fact that we still have much to learn from experiences in 
this	field.	Various	efforts	have	been	made	to	review	global	
progress with PWS, but there has been no systematic, 
widespread or rigorous review of what these schemes have 
achieved. This paper mainly focuses on low- and middle-
income countries, but also draws on well-known experiences 
in the United States, Europe and Australia, looking at the 
evidence collected to date and published in journals and 
reports. The main sources of information include: 
■■ IIED’s  PWS profiles (available online at www.
watershedmarkets.org)  These were prepared for a 
review of PWS which identified 50 ongoing and 45 
proposed schemes (Porras et al., 2008) up from  41 
proposed and ongoing schemes in low- and middle-
income countries identified in an earlier review (Landell-
Mills and Porras, 2002). The profiles were updated in 
2012 and new schemes and proposals identified.  
■■ Forest Trends State of the Water Markets (Stanton et 
al., 2010). Here, the emphasis was mostly on monetary 
payments and other economic instruments for managing 
water. 
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■■ Websites of the main regional PES-hubs. Specifically 
RUPES in Asia and PRESA in Eastern Africa. 
Schemes are not implemented in a linear manner, and many 
proposals are abandoned or absorbed into other projects or 
type of instrument. In Africa, for example, approximately half of 
proposals never make it to the pilot or implementation stages 
(Berttram, 2011). 
1.2 A working definition of PWS
The idea of PES is underpinned by the notion that ecosystems 
become degraded because ecosystem services are not 
properly valued. PES schemes try to create an economic 
mechanism (usually to complement regulation) that will 
internalise the positive environmental externalities associated 
with the production of particular ecosystem services, including 
watershed protection, biodiversity and carbon sequestration 
(Kosoy et al., 2007; Porras et al., 2008; Wunder, 2005). 
The three main characteristics of PES schemes identified by 
Porras et al. (2008) include: 
■■ suppliers or sellers of ecosystem services responding 
to an offer of compensation made by one or more 
beneficiaries (NGOs, private parties, local or central 
government entities, and/or a separate beneficiary that is 
not a central government entity); 
■■ compensation being tied to land management practices 
specified by the programme; 
■■ only the supply-side of the transaction is voluntary, in that 
providers enter in to the contract of their own free will. 
Payments are made in cash or in kind. Ideally, they will fall 
somewhere between the opportunity costs of managing the 
land and the value (measured or perceived) that the user or 
bundle of users place on the ecosystem service (see section 
3.2.2). Payments for watershed services generally encourage 
the adoption of land practices that are expected to influence the 
biophysical attributes of an ecosystem and affect the provision 
of freshwater supplies (see section 3.2.1). 
PES and PWS schemes in low- and middle-income countries 
have paid more attention to different types of land practice that 
are expected to provide a particular environmental service (see 
Table 1 below) than to measuring and rewarding the changes 
observed at ecosystem level. Activities that support the provision 
of bundled environmental services are sometimes expected to 
complement each other. For example, forest conservation is 
expected to maintain existing water quality and quantity, protect 
biodiversity and safeguard the beauty of the landscape, and is 
therefore often ‘marketed’ as a ‘bundle’. Conversely, there may 
be trade-offs between watershed services and other ecosystem 
services (like carbon), as carbon projects that promote large-
scale reforestation may potentially reduce other ecosystem 
services like biodiversity and water flows, especially in water-
strained environments and when using fast-growing, single exotic 
species (see Calder, 2005).
Interest in PWS-type projects rose sharply between 2002 and 
2008. A review of emerging markets for environmental services 
conducted by IIED in 2002 found 41 proposed and ongoing 
schemes in low- and middle-income countries (Landell-Mills and 
Porras, 2002). By 2008, this had risen to at least 50 ongoing 
schemes and nearly as many proposals at different stages, 
despite major setbacks in some cases (Porras et al., 2008). A 
2010 review by Forest Trends looking at PWS and water quality 
trading indicates that these schemes have not been implemented 
in a linear manner, and that many proposals are abandoned or 
absorbed into other projects or type of instrument (Stanton 
et al, 2010). In Africa, for example, approximately half of 
proposals never make it to the pilot or implementation stages 
(Bond, 2008). 
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2. Conditionality and additionality 
Conditionality refers to the conditions attached to a PES 
contract. Although the theory suggests that payments are only 
made if ecosystem services are provided (Wunder, 2005), in 
practice there seems to be a link between the payments or 
incentives and the actions contracted under PWS schemes. 
Additionality refers to the net positive impact in the provision 
of ecosystem services created by the payment, compared with 
the baseline scenario or hypothetical situation where no such 
scheme is in place (Pascual et al., 2009). In other words, it is 
the change in land use generated by the payment, which can 
be compared with what would have happened without the 
programme (‘business as usual’, see Wunder et al., 2008). 
For the purpose of this paper, conditionality is seen as the 
way that incentives change behaviour; and additionality as 
the manner and extent to which actions on the ground lead 
to net changes in watershed services. Both are affected by 
the nature of the initiative concerned, the thought given to its 
design, the account taken of reliable scientific information and 
the care with which it is implemented. 
In terms of monitoring and evaluation, conditionality is 
monitored for compliance, and additionality for effectiveness. 
It can generally be expected that PWS schemes will need 
to demonstrate a high level of compliance in order to be 
effective. The conditionality implicit in PWS contracts is 
typically a necessary step in generating additional benefits to 
those that would occur without the PWS scheme. However, 
a high degree of compliance does not necessarily equate to 
a high degree of effectiveness, as a poorly designed scheme 
may target the wrong land managers or land that is least at 
risk, meaning that the payments may not generate the desired 
hydro-ecological or conservation benefits. A case in point is 
the lack of additionality in the early part of the Costa Rican 
PES scheme (Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007). 
2.1 Monitoring compliance 
It is necessary to monitor compliance to ensure that the 
land manager and ‘buyer’ stick to the terms of the contract. 
With input-based systems, the focus is on the transaction. 
Assumptions are made about the impacts of predetermined 
land-use activities, and these changes are monitored 
accordingly. Output-based systems concentrate on changes 
in the ecosystem service, leaving the land manager to make 
the internal adjustments needed to provide the service. 
Compliance monitoring usually is linked to: 
■■ the suitability of the land uses selected to provide the 
required ecosystem service
■■ the type and level of payment as an indicator of whether it 
constitutes a realistic incentive
■■ strategies to monitor contract compliance (self-monitoring, 
group monitoring, remote monitoring)
■■ the type and credibility of the sanctions. 
In simple terms, compliance monitoring seeks to ensure 
that the conditionality inherent in a PWS scheme is put into 
practice, and that the project is implemented effectively. Only 
then is the conditionality in place to drive additionality. 
2.2 Monitoring environmental 
effectiveness 
Effectiveness is monitored in order to ascertain the extent 
to which a PWS scheme has achieved its overall objectives. 
This kind of monitoring tracks how the reward offered by a 
scheme leads to improved watershed services and ecological 
outcomes. If the same ecological outcomes would have 
occurred without the PWS scheme, then it is not effective, 
and there is no additionality. 
Effectiveness monitoring is linked to: 
■■ the existence of an appropriate baseline
■■ attribution
■■ targeting strategies 
■■ leakage and spillovers. 
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3. Evidence from application 
This paper expands on the framework presented by Wunder 
et al. (2008), using the theory and evidence available from 
existing schemes to examine evaluation criteria and consider 
the outcomes and lessons to be learned from monitoring 
and evaluation efforts to date. Although some schemes have 
been going for several years, the ‘market’ is relatively new 
and loosely defined, and evidence of impact is still thin on the 
ground (Porras et al., 2008; Wunder, 2005). 
The PWS schemes reviewed in this paper are presented in 
the Annex. 
3.1 The reported impacts of ongoing 
schemes 
Most existing schemes in low- and middle-income countries are 
intended to change or improve land management decisions, 
regardless of the size of the payments made. It seems that well-
designed and monitored contracts can encourage high levels 
of compliance, thereby impacting on land use and (for some) 
on water quantity and quality. The following sections discuss 
the factors that affect these results, and how they can be 
monitored. Some of the main reported impacts are listed below. 
Impacts on land use
■■ The conditional land tenure scheme in Sumberjaya, 
Indonesia, now covers about 70 per cent of the protection 
forest (compared with only 7 per cent in 2004), building 
on the Indonesian law for community-based forest 
management. Conditional land tenure is now in place for 
6,400 farmers that use practices such as multi-storey 
coffee gardens (Suyanto, 2010). 
■■ By February 2010, the Costa Rica national programme 
covered nearly 730,000 hectares of forest and had 
planted nearly 3 million trees in agroforestry plantations.
■■ Between 2000 and 2007 the PSAH (National Programme 
for Hydrological Environmental Services) programme in 
Mexico had reduced the rate of deforestation from 1.6 per 
cent to 0.6 per cent (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2011).
■■ The total plantation area in China amounts to 53 million 
hectares. This includes 28 million hectares planted in six 
years by the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme, and 
8.8 million hectares of crops that have been converted to 
plantations through the Cropland to Forest Programme 
(Sun and Chen, 2006; Xu et al., 2010).
Box 2. The perceived impacts of certain schemes
It seems to have become common practice to ask users about perceived changes in water services since the introduction 
of a PWS scheme. Kosoy et al. (2005) report that the majority of water users in Jesus de Otoro in Honduras and Heredia in 
Costa Rica see water provision as the most important benefit from forests, and believe that increased forest cover will lead 
to better water quality and greater water availability. They also note that 64 per cent of the 100 users interviewed in Jesus de 
Otoro and 39 per cent of the 100 interviewees in Heredia thought that water availability had improved in the past two years – 
although it is hard to see how any changes could be attributed to the PWS schemes, given the short time frame and the small 
geographical area covered in both cases. This difficulty in attributing benefits to PWS applies to other cases as well. It has 
been suggested that a perceived reduction in pollution from coffee-processing waste in Campamento, Honduras, had more to 
do with falling coffee prices and activity levels, and that pollution would increase again as coffee prices recovered (Ardón and 
Barrantes, 2003). 
The case of Meijiang in China illustrates the difficulty of drawing conclusions about the impact of land management 
practices introduced by PWS, when farmer perceptions vary and other factors such as the extraction of river sand may help 
reduce sedimentation. Leshan et al. (2005) interviewed several farmers involved in the scheme. When asked about water 
quality, they reported an initial increase in soil erosion while the new activities were under way (building terraced strips, 
level ditches, bamboo ditches and planting), but did not see environmental pollution as a problem despite the common use 
of fertilisers and pesticides. There was no consensus on the impact of orchard development on water flow, as half of the 
interviewees said that it had increased and half that it had decreased.
Source: Porras et al. 2008
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■■ Small-scale projects like San Pedro Norte in Nicaragua 
have now expanded to other areas under the Fondo 
Nacional de Desarrollo Forestal (FONADEFO). Other 
examples include small PWS schemes in the Murciélago 
y Corcuera watersheds in Rivas, El Sauce in Leon, 
and Cerro San Rafael in Chinandega (see http://www.
fonadefo.org/proyectos.php for more information). 
■■ In Ecuador, FONAG had more than 65,000 hectares 
under land management by 2008. However, the 
plantations that have been established are still too 
young to have their impact evaluated, and thresholds are 
regarded as very small, with about 2.5 per cent of the total 
area reforested (Cannon et al., 2010).
Impacts on water quantity
■■ Statistics for local water availability upstream in Colombia 
indicate that long-term trends for annual rainfall and 
irregular fluctuations are due to large-scale geographical 
causes rather than the status of local forests (Kosoy et al., 
2005).
■■ Protecting cloud forests has little economic impact on 
water. Hydrological studies in Monteverde show that 
cloud forests have a modest impact on water budgets in 
the mountains, and very little effect on dry-season flows 
because of the relatively regular rainfall in the area. Most 
of the economic value of marginal flows is absorbed by 
the intra-annual reservoir downstream (Porras, 2008). 
A hydrological study in Los Negros, Bolivia, found no 
relationship between forest cover and streamflow (Le 
Tellier et al., 2009) and studies near the area covered by 
Fidecoagua in Mexico confirm this trend, although they 
also do show that old secondary forests have roughly the 
same hydrological behaviour as established natural cloud 
forest	(Muñoz-Villers	et al., 2010). 
■■ Studies of páramo near Cuenca in Ecuador show that pine 
plantations decrease annual water yields, that livestock 
grazing does not affect soil compaction because of low 
herd density, and that cultivation mainly affects regulation 
by increasing the magnitude of peak flows and reducing 
base flows (Crespo et al., 2009). 
■■ Salas (2004) noted that a severe reduction in water 
volume was reported following reforestation activities 
with fast-growing exotic species (mainly mahogany and 
gmelina).
■■ Models used to calculate the impacts of the Working 
for Water programme on water flows in South Africa 
estimate that it generates 48 to 56 million cubic metres of 
additional water per annum (DWAF, 2006; Swallow et al., 
2009).
Impacts on water quality 
■■ Community	monitoring	in	Valle	del	Bravo,	Mexico,	
indicates that water quality is good in forested areas 
receiving payments, but that it declines in lower areas of 
the watershed. This suggests that there may be potential 
problems with fish farms and domestic or industrial 
wastewaters (Manson, 2008). Fidecoagua implemented 
communal payments alongside the PSAH and reported 
a decline in sediments, although it is hard to judge the 
validity of this claim (Blanco and Rojo, 2005).
■■ Forest protection in El Triunfo has helped reduce the 
accumulation of sediment and lower heat levels. This 
has had positive effects on shrimp catches and the local 
fishing industry (Stem, 2005), although it is difficult 
to attribute these impacts to a reduction in the risk of 
deforestation without a baseline. 
■■ San Pedro del Norte (Chinandega, Nicaragua) reported 
that water sources have become permanent since the 
introduction of the scheme (Obando, 2007), although 
the lack of an in-depth hydrological study and relatively 
small size of the scheme make it difficult to unequivocally 
attribute this development to it. Nevertheless, a study by 
Kosoy et al. (2005) suggests that this scheme (alongside 
Jesus de Otoro and Puerto Barrios) can demonstrate with 
a degree of confidence that the agreed environmental 
service is provided, and specify the threshold areas 
required to reach specific quality targets. 
■■ A successful lesson from the Hunter River Salinity Trading 
in New South Wales, Australia, shows that salinity targets 
for a total area of 2.2 million hectares were met at all times 
in the upper sector of the river when discharges were 
allowed under the scheme (NSW, 2009).
3.2 Lessons from compliance 
monitoring
In this paper, we concentrate on monitoring compliance and 
evaluating the efficacy of programmes. The implication is 
that monitoring and evaluation involves providing assurances 
that the agreed land management or production practices 
have been put in place. Compliance and the resulting 
implementation of PWS are crucial for environmental 
effectiveness, and must be considered a necessary condition 
for successful schemes. Compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms are included in PWS schemes more often than 
hydrological monitoring. 
3.2.1 Indicators and activities promoted 
under PWS 
Kroeger and Casey (2007) highlight the potential loss of 
ecosystem services due to the difficulty of identifying and 
defining particular service units, and the resulting ability 
(or inability) to measure changes in services (this point is 
discussed more in depth in section 3.3.1). Thus, determining 
how a particular service is to be measured also helps identify 
the potential constraints to monitoring and evaluation. Clear 
biophysical interconnections between the land use activities 
prescribed by a PWS scheme and the resulting hydrological 
effects need to be identified, understood and communicated 
to all programme participants, particularly providers and 
beneficiaries (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). 
Land practices often serve as a proxy for watershed services 
when PWS schemes are monitored and evaluated, due to the 
assumption that particular land management techniques will 
increase the probability of downstream recipients receiving 
the desired services (Asquith and Wunder, 2008; Ortiz et 
al., 2003; Porras et al., 2008). However, one cannot be 
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certain that this will happen because of the external factors 
or confounders (see section 3.3.2) that influence hydrological 
conditions in watersheds (Asquith and Wunder, 2008). 
The use of proxy actions to represent the production 
of desired watershed services is often based on local 
assumptions and perceived biophysical interconnections that 
tend to oversimplify complex ecosystem functions (Echavarria 
et al., 2004; Gutrich et al., 2005; Kaimowitz, 2004). Thus, it 
is widely assumed that there is a positive correlation between 
forest cover and the quality and quantity of water provided 
by a watershed (Echavarria et al., 2004; Rojas and Aylward, 
2003b; Saberwal, 1998), and that changes in the condition 
of vegetative cover indicate changes in hydrological functions 
(Asquith and Wunder, 2008). Some proponents of this view 
base their programme assessments on surveys of stakeholder 
perceptions rather than on-site hydrological studies (see Box 
3 below), and rapid assessment methodologies such as the 
toolkit introduced by RUPES in Asia (Jeanes et al., 2006) 
and the broader toolkit explored by UNEP (CCI and BirdLife 
International, 2011) are increasingly promoted as a means of 
bridging the gap between science and local perceptions. 
Given the complexity of watershed ecosystem functions and 
the fact that common myths often prove to be unfounded, 
assuming that traditional actions such as reforestation 
will deliver certain services (expected increased in water 
flows) seems a questionable extrapolation (Aylward, 2005; 
Bruijnzeel, 2004a; Bruijnzeel et al., 2010; Calder, 2005). 
3.2.2 Monitoring the adequacy and timing of 
payments 
Payment levels. Schemes need to cover the opportunity 
costs of their actions in order to avoid compromising long-
term participation. Failure to do so may make alternative 
land uses more attractive, and pass costs on to farmers 
(possibly unjustly). The overall PWS payment ideally sits 
somewhere between the value of the service to users (or 
their representative, such as the government) and the cost 
of implementing the land use that is expected to provide the 
service. 
The way that opportunity costs are calculated should be 
taken into account when assessing the adequacy of the 
compensation allocated to service providers (Hoffman, 2009). 
In order to provide effective or adequate compensation, 
payments to suppliers (landowners) should exceed or at the 
very least meet the opportunity costs of intended land uses 
outside those specified by a PWS scheme (Engel et al., 2008; 
White and Minang, 2011). 
Placing a value on the opportunity costs not only helps 
determine whether payments are adequate, but can also 
enhance the environmental efficiency of a scheme by 
differentiating between payments, especially in cases where 
there are budgetary constraints or excessive demand. For 
example, it was found that too much compensation was being 
paid for approximately 75 per cent of the land enrolled in the 
Fundacion Natura scheme in Bolivia, and not nearly enough 
for other areas (Hoffman, 2009). 
Most opportunity cost analyses tend to be unduly simplistic. 
There are a number of reasons for this:
■■ Opportunity cost calculations are often based on fairly 
basic cash flow analysis that fails to account for risks and 
uncertainties or the different timescales to which rural land 
managers work. 
■■ Changing behaviour involves giving up previous practices 
or ‘losing' gains that used to be made through traditional 
land management. In behavioural economics, this is 
associated with an ‘endowment effect’ (also known as 
‘divestiture aversion’), which reflects people’s tendency to 
focus on what they lose or give up in a transaction rather 
than what they gain from it. 
■■ Simple cash flow analyses do not take account of the 
seller’s possible inner motivation for developing and 
implementing a PWS transaction. 
This suggests that a basic opportunity cost analysis (which 
tends to provide a static picture) will understate the incentives 
needed to motivate land managers to engage in a transaction 
and change their behaviour. Even when opportunity costs 
are judged accurately, the decision to participate may be 
influenced by non-monetary issues like seller remorse or group 
pressure, which impact on participation in the programme 
as word spreads through the community of potential sellers. 
Box 3. Stretching the complentarity 
of carbon and water?
In the Piura region of Peru a pilot group of the UK-based 
Cafédirect AdapCC project and the Peru-based Cepicafe 
(one of Cafédirect’s suppliers) is involved in a combined 
initiative to engage with the carbon market, provide 
protection against flash floods and support sustainable 
local farming. Farmers are using pine trees and native 
quinal species to reforest degraded grasslands at higher 
elevations (70 per cent pine and 30 per cent quinal). Until 
now Cafédirect has pre-paid funds to purchase credits 
in order to help get the project up and running, but it 
is expected that 10 per cent of the carbon credit sales 
from saplings will go to Cepicafe, under the CarbonFix 
standard.
The pilot has planted 224 hectares so far, and 
ultimately aims to cover 5,000 hectares (Lee, 2012, in 
The Ecologist). Although the project has been widely 
applauded, there are some questions as to how it will 
be scaled up and what effect this will have on the wider 
ecosystem, especially if it continues to use pine as the 
main species. Piura is located in the northern coastal 
desert of Peru where extreme weather conditions combine 
very low average annual precipitation with marked rainfall 
during the wet season. Hydrologists have long warned 
that the high water requirements of fast-growing forest 
species in large plantations can significantly reduce water 
flows downstream (Calder and Aylward, 2006). This is a 
particular problem in areas like the desert of Peru, where 
water is very scarce. 
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Therefore, keeping an eye on opportunity costs is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for successful PWS. 
Apart from monitoring the adequacy of payments, there 
is the much larger question of whether PWS schemes 
deliver economic value, and whether there is an associated 
increase in environmental services (see next section). There 
are methods for valuing hydrological services, as for any 
non-marketed good or service (Freeman, 1993), but they 
can be difficult and costly to apply. Until now, this type of 
valuation has usually been done in the context of academic 
studies that are not linked to PWS, or as preliminary efforts 
to justify PWS schemes in which the opportunity costs of 
previous production or replacement costs are used as the 
measure of value. This approach is largely meaningless in 
terms of environmental services (Rojas and Aylward, 2003a) 
as the impact on producers’ net profits from farming reveals 
nothing about the value of watershed services that would be 
derived from the land under alternative scenarios. Behavioural 
economics based on multi-stakeholder, multi-criteria analysis 
and hydrological studies is increasingly used to provide a 
better assessment of the non-financial values and costs for 
ecosystem services (Spangenberg and Settele, 2010). 
Type and timing of payments. As the name implies, PWS 
schemes involve some form of compensation for agreed 
activities. This can be made in cash or in kind, as one-off or 
continuous payments. According to economic theory, cash 
payments are superior to payments in kind because of the way 
that they affect the recipient’s utility and expenditure behaviour 
(Currie and Gahvari, 2007). In-kind transfers are often seen as 
paternalistic, but may be useful when cash is seen as culturally 
inappropriate	(Wunder	and	Vargas,	2005)	or	when	large	
numbers of suppliers render per capita cash payments too 
small to be meaningful. 
The type of payment will have implications for programme 
compliance. For example, in-kind, one-off compensation may 
provide immediate benefits but is very difficult to withdraw in 
the case of non-compliance. Smaller, continuous payments 
may encourage long-term compliance, but will be insufficient 
to encourage people to make expensive initial investments in 
their farm if they are too low. 
3.2.3 Field monitoring strategies
It should be noted that this discussion focuses on field 
monitoring rather than overall project monitoring, which can 
involve multi-stakeholder boards and independent audits 
(such as the FONAG trust fund in Ecuador). Here, compliance 
monitoring is concerned with the enforcement of contracts 
with individuals, associations or local facilitators. Stakeholders 
and participants may be involved if there is adequate capacity 
on both sides. This helps reduce transaction costs (Reis et 
al., 2007), but this type of ‘monitoring’ generally refers to data 
collection (readings from staff gauges or water quality tests) 
rather than the assessment of environmental additionality. 
Delegating monitoring and enforcement to programme 
participants is common practice among institutions that are 
responsible for managing sustainable common pool resources 
(Ostrom, 1990). Intermediaries such as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) can also help reduce costs, as with the 
technical assistance to Costa Rica’s national PSA provided by 
FUNDECOR and CODEFORSA in exchange for a proportion 
of the final payment received by farmers (Porras et al., 2012). 
What this means in effect is that many transaction costs are 
shifted from the buyer (government) to the seller (farmer).
The most common types of compliance monitoring found in 
existing schemes include: 
■■ self-monitoring  
■■ participatory monitoring by a group or groups of providers, 
or by interested parties 
■■ expert monitoring using measurements and remote 
sensing (usually complemented by an independent audit).
Insights from Principal Agent Models1 suggest that the most 
cost-effective schemes are likely to have a structure where the 
provider has an incentive to monitor and truthfully report on 
their own actions (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). For example, 
the collective action scheme promoted by Bio-Rights2  (van 
Eijk  and Kumar, 2009)   provides community members with 
micro-credit for sustainable projects. If they deliver the agreed 
changes in land use they receive a payment equivalent to the 
Box 4. Multi-stakeholder monitoring 
in Los Negros, Bolivia  
This scheme did not establish baseline water flows 
and bird species diversity before activities began, as 
it concentrated on vegetative cover and an assumed 
relationship with environmental services. Basic hydrological 
relationships were not explored, and remain unknown and 
assumed. Forest conservation plots are measured and 
demarcated with hand-held GPS receivers and plotted 
onto a land-use map based on satellite images from 2001. 
Fields are demarcated according to natural boundaries 
or trails, signs and wire fencing. The various forest types 
in the parcel are then mapped and their areas calculated, 
and farmers are given a copy of ‘their’ map along with their 
contract. 
The project control team, which consists of one member 
from upstream and one from downstream environmental 
committees, a nature field technician and the landowner, 
visits each enrolled property once a year. They receive 
US$20 per diem to monitor changes in land use, using 
GPS and maps, and submit a report to the Enforcement 
Directorate (the President of Natura and presidents of the 
upstream and downstream environmental committees). The 
Directorate makes recommendations on how to respond to 
infractions, if necessary. 
Monitoring was recently extended to measuring water 
flows in several tributaries, and an avifaunal survey was 
conducted in 2005. Recent results show that the scheme 
has not had an impact on additionality as the land set aside 
for conservation is the least threatened by agricultural 
clearance (Robertson and Wunder, 2005), and a rapid 
hydrological assessment showed no initial impact on 
water flows (Le Tellier et al., 2009). Several universities, 
including	Vu	University,	Amsterdam,	are	now	involved	in	a	
larger study in Rio Grande (2010–2014). See http://www.
naturabolivia.org/eva2.html
Source: Asquith et al. 2008
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original loan (which by then would have been repaid). With 
this type of initiative, and for group monitoring (see below), 
participants such as forest owners and households need 
clearly specified measurement protocols to follow when 
collecting data for monitoring. The Myrada project, which 
works in 32 micro-watersheds in India, reports that loans 
(rather than contributions) improve people’s motivation to 
better monitor and manage investments (Prakash Fernandez, 
2003).
Participatory monitoring can take two forms: monitoring by 
providers, and monitoring through multi-stakeholder groups 
that may include service buyers. In the first case, service 
providers monitor each other while the buyer (intermediary, 
government, direct user) monitors the group and holds the 
group accountable for the inputs and outcomes. Monitoring by 
peers is useful in systems where service delivery is contingent 
upon multiple resource-management units, and has proved 
successful in community forest management contracts in 
India. Social disapproval can be an important control tool, 
and has been suggested as an effective means of ensuring 
transparency and participation in REDD+ projects (Skutsch et 
al., 2009). Group pressure is useful in group contracts where 
an entire group of service providers has to bear the cost of a 
single individual’s non-compliance. 
The second type of monitoring, by multi-stakeholder groups, 
is more common in small schemes where representatives 
from the local communities, municipalities and/or NGOs 
concerned form a voluntary commission and make field 
visits and recommendations. This method has been used 
in Los Negros in Bolivia (Asquith et al., 2008b), San Pedro 
Norte, Nicaragua (Marín et al., 2006; Porras et al., 2008) 
and Fidecoagua, Coatepec in Mexico. However, it can be 
ineffective if the groups are weak and have limited options to 
enforce cooperative behaviour and deal with free-riders, like 
the short-lived Group Contracts in the PSA in Costa Rica 
(Porras, 2010).
Remote sensing can be a useful monitoring tool when 
checking for rough changes in forest cover. Some national 
schemes, like the PSAH in Mexico, the PSA in Costa Rica 
and BioBosque in Ecuador, use it in tandem with independent 
audits by forest regents. Several models are also available 
free of charge on the internet, although most have been 
developed for use within the United States (see RedLAC, 
2010, for examples). However, remote sensing is not useful 
for monitoring actual changes in watershed services, and 
can only provide a blunt measure of whether land cover has 
changed or not.  
3.2.4 Enforcement, penalties and gaps
Compliance and enforcement mechanisms should be 
implemented in the early stages of a scheme, although 
some have been set up as ’learning by doing’ exercises, 
as in Pimampiro (Echavarria et al., 2004). It has to be said 
that compliance monitoring is typically less than optimal, 
as inadequate funding, lack of institutional capacity and 
capabilities (shortages of enforcement staff) and poor 
communication between stakeholders, intermediaries and 
regulatory officials all serve to weaken compliance monitoring 
and enforcement (Echavarria et al., 2004; Wunder and Albán, 
2008). 
Sanctions for non-compliance usually involve a period of 
exclusion from the scheme, the cancellation or suspension 
of payments (Claassen et al., 2008; Echavarria et al., 2004; 
Wunder and Albán, 2008) or the threat of civil legal action if 
contracts are breached, as in the PSA Programme in Costa 
Rica. Observed and anticipated penalties, the likelihood 
of enforcement and the perceived threat of sanctions can 
help reduce the costs associated with monitoring (as with 
self-enforced monitoring), particularly in smaller communities 
where social pressure and learning have the potential to 
encourage cooperation (Wunder and Albán, 2008; Wunder et 
al., 2008). However, information asymmetries (hidden actions 
or moral hazard) can affect conditionality if conservation 
agents find it expensive to monitor contract compliance and 
politically costly to sanction non-compliance (especially in 
contracts with poor groups) – in which case they will fail to 
enforce the contract. High fines are often used as a deterrent 
to non-compliance, but the voluntary nature of PWS limits 
the range of sanctions that can be applied, meaning that 
landowners have an incentive to breach their contractual 
responsibilities (Pattanayak et al., 2010; Wunder, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the payments themselves can act as a 
mechanism to encourage compliance. When participation 
is properly monitored and payments are truly conditional, 
providers ‘learn’ to comply, particularly when the level 
of payment properly compensates them for the services 
rendered (Claassen et al., 2008; Kosoy et al., 2007). 
In short, compliance monitoring and enforcement are 
necessary to demonstrate that watershed actions are 
delivered according to the terms of the contract. Being clear 
about what action is required is one thing; what is much 
harder is establishing that taking such action actually leads to 
changes in land management practices, as these might have 
occurred without the scheme. This leaves us with the question 
of whether examining the efficacy of contracted-for actions 
is sufficient to demonstrate service delivery, or whether 
hydrological monitoring is also necessary.
3.3 Demonstrating the effectiveness 
or additionality of a scheme  
The land management or production practices that are 
incentivised through PWS schemes are intended to cause an 
effect: to change watershed or hydrological functions. In the 
context of PES, additionality can be defined as a scheme’s 
overall ability to instigate the intended outcomes, which 
would not have happened if it had not been implemented 
(Claassen et al., 2008; Muñoz et al., 2005; Shrestha and 
Timilsnia, 2002). This change in function is presumed to have 
consequences for human wellbeing in terms of economic 
costs and benefits or welfare, particularly for the poor. Here 
we focus on monitoring to determine whether or not a PWS 
scheme can be said to be environmentally effective. 
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3.3.1 Indicators and baselines 
When looking at watershed functions, we need to measure 
one or more components of water quality and quantity in order 
to show an effect. This often involves measuring temperature 
and reductions in sediment, nutrient and chemical loads to 
assess water quality, and hydrographic features such as base, 
peak or low flows for a quantitative assessment. A substantial 
baseline may be required to demonstrate both qualitative 
and quantitative environmental additionality – but even when 
such data are available, it can be difficult to compare sources. 
The hydrological records for water flow that do exist are 
from gauges that have been operating for a long time, while 
technologies for monitoring remote and continuous water 
quality are much more recent. 
Asquith et al. (2008) highlight the importance of composing 
a baseline for monitoring, noting that sound measurement 
and evaluation of PES schemes requires a preliminary 
understanding of the biophysical interconnections in targeted 
areas. Most baselines have focused on measuring forest cover 
in properties, usually using ground-truth (information collected 
on location) GIS-based technology supplemented with some 
ground measurement, rather than measuring the quality or 
quantity of the watershed service. The Working for Water 
programme in South Africa is an exception to this trend, in 
that it established a hydrological baseline before commencing 
activities (Turpie et al., 2008). This is not to say that projects 
do not monitor changes in watershed services; rather, that 
it tends to be done with less vigour than for changes in land 
use. For example, FONAG in Ecuador has installed fairly 
sophisticated weather stations and soil moisture monitoring 
stations (Cannon et al., 2010), while Los Negros in Bolivia 
undertakes hydrological monitoring to look at changes in 
water quantity and biota (see box above). The Working for 
Water programme in South Africa monitors the number of 
alien species removed from river edges, but only estimates 
changes in water quantity through modelling (Ferraro, 2009). 
All monitoring efforts have to deal with the aforementioned 
problem of attribution and the difficulty of establishing causal 
links with any degree of certainty, due to patchy or short-term 
data collection, stochastic events (such as weather patterns) 
masking local impacts, and uncertainty about groundwater 
movements.
Schemes in rich countries have been more successful in 
using baselines to monitor outputs (the level of ecosystem 
services provided). It is not clear why this practice is not 
more widespread in low- and middle-income countries, but 
it may be linked to existing capacities, access to technology 
and increasing demand for proof of how such programmes 
work. The Hunter River Salinity Trading scheme in New 
South Wales, Australia, has been successful in managing 
salinity levels along the river. This scheme monitors and 
caps discharges from 23 coalmining and power generation 
facilities, and allows credits to be traded depending on the 
flow	of	the	river	(NSW,	2009).	The	Vittel	project	in	France	
monitors water quality extensively in all participating farm 
sites (Perrot-Maitre, 2006); while the conditional land tenure 
scheme in Sumberjaya is an early example of payments for 
reduced sediments that had the added value of creating a 
market use for captured sediments (Harto Widodo et al., 
2006).
Apart from these isolated examples, very few schemes have 
developed measuring programmes built on a sound baseline 
for ecosystem services (Agarwal et al., 2007; Porras et al., 
2008). The fact that some early schemes failed to establish 
a baseline for prior land management or practices also 
constitutes a fundamental obstacle to monitoring their basic 
additionality. 
3.3.2 Attribution
Demonstrating environmental additionality involves much 
more than having a prior record measuring the desired 
hydrological variable. It is also necessary to understand the 
relationship between the action and that variable – which 
can create further obstacles even where baseline data 
on water quantity or quality do exist. The key issue here is 
attribution: understanding whether factors other than the 
target actions affect water quality and quantity over time, 
and how they do so. This implies the ability to consult data 
on potentially confounding drivers as well as on the principle 
action concerned. While this can be quite difficult and time-
consuming with regard to PWS, failure to take this crucial 
step may lead to faulty conclusions about cause and effect, 
with PWS programmes deemed to be successful when 
Box 5. Collecting information
So how much research is needed before and during 
the implementation of PWS schemes? Information is 
very valuable, but it does come at a cost. The amount 
of research needed to implement these schemes varies 
according to the nature and scale of the problem, and the 
level of funding available for this type of study. The Bellagio 
Conversations (Asquith and Wunder, 2008) provide a 
useful rule of thumb for starting a PWS scheme. The 
simplest schemes involve conserving existing ecosystems 
that are under threat in order to maintain water quality or 
quantity. Mechanisms for such schemes can be based 
on the precautionary principle, and studies can follow in 
time, as in the case of Los Negros in Bolivia (Asquith, 
Vargas	and	Wunder,	2008).	Restoring	habitat	is	more	
complicated, as research will be required to demonstrate 
bio-geochemical linkages with water quality, threshold 
levels and cost-effectiveness; while research on water 
quantity is even more complicated if no site-specific 
information is already available. The wisest course of action 
in such cases is to undertake a series of inexpensive 
‘no-regret’ actions until more in-depth research has been 
conducted to determine whether or not to implement a full-
scale PWS scheme. 
Van	Noordwijk	(2005)	provides	a	useful	description	of	
the types of watershed services, key indicators, ways of 
measuring them (or proxies if needed) and how these 
indicators can be monitored locally. In their book about 
forests, water and people in the tropics, Bonell and 
Bruijnzeel (2005) present several papers on collecting 
information that cover remote sensing technologies, 
statistical methods and selecting models. Although they 
have their limitations, these methods currently provide the 
best information about the impacts of land-use changes on 
water variables. 
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they actually had little or no impact on watershed services. 
Conversely, a lack of evident outcomes may be linked to 
external factors other than programme design. 
The Maasin watershed programme in the Philippines clearly 
illustrates the problems that can arise with attribution. There 
was a marked reduction in water flows and significant siltation 
in the area three years after this programme started. While 
some blamed the fast-growing species used by the scheme 
(mainly mahogany and gmelina), other factors also needed to 
be taken into account, such as the fact that the water utilities 
were using more water than before, and that siltation had 
increased as farmers displaced by the programme tilled new 
land. In the event, none of these hypotheses were explored, 
and the arguments stopped when the rains restarted (Salas, 
2004). 
3.3.3 Targeting strategies
Recent studies assessing the additionality of PWS schemes 
indicate that enrolment-based (voluntary) mechanisms may 
negatively influence the efficiency and effectiveness of a 
programme, as it may end up with lands that are at low risk of 
degradation or have little influence over hydrological changes 
(Asquith and Wunder, 2008; Hoffman, 2009; Kalacska et al., 
2008; Muñoz et al., 2005; Pfaff et al., 2008; Robertson and 
Wunder, 2005). For voluntary contracts like those promoted 
in PWS schemes, targeting and/or the use of preferential 
criteria for contract allocation can help increase environmental 
effectiveness (Sen, 1996). Monitoring the type of targeting 
used and the scheme’s ability to enforce it can help indicate 
the potential impact on the watershed service. 
Effective targeting entails selecting an appropriate location 
and choosing resources that will deliver services of the 
required quality. PWS schemes typically involve one buyer 
(usually the government) with monopsonic powers, including 
the ability to select and change prices, which is an important 
tool in targeting through price differentiation. 
Critical areas can be targeted by directing payments towards 
watersheds that are important for human watershed services 
(domestic water use or hydroelectricity), areas that are prone 
to degradation (high slopes, river edges) or at greater risk from 
changes in land use (such as forest clearance for agriculture). 
It is easier for local schemes to target precise areas around 
the headwaters of the main water supply (such as Pimampiro 
in Ecuador, Tacuba in El Salvador, Jesus de Otoro in 
Honduras, and San Pedro Norte in Nicaragua). Wunder and 
Albán (2008) argue that targeting the small-scale scheme in 
Pimampiro has helped stop deforestation and contributed to 
the marked recovery of native vegetation, bucking the trends 
in most neighbouring villages. Approximately 30 per cent of 
the total area had been converted to cropping and pastures 
before payments were introduced in 2000, compared with 
just 14 per cent in 2005. It is hard to determine the scheme’s 
effect on water availability as there are no baseline studies 
or appropriate counterfactuals to draw on, and downstream 
perceptions of increased water flows may be influenced by 
improvements to the infrastructure introduced at the start of 
the PES scheme (Echavarria et al., 2004). In Los Negros, 
Bolivia, lack of targeting and very low rates of compensation 
(covering only 2–10 per cent of the opportunity costs of 
setting aside agricultural land) meant that the areas selected 
by farmers for the scheme had less agricultural potential 
and were therefore at less risk of conversion (Asquith et al., 
2008b; Robertson and Wunder, 2005). Better targeting 
critical areas may result in fewer participants, but can make 
a scheme more attractive by increasing individual levels of 
compensation (Asquith et al., 2008b; Wunder, 2008).
Lack of targeting can also dilute the potential benefits of large 
schemes, especially national ones. Analysis of the Sloping 
Land Conversion programme in China, which took a very top-
down approach, shows that 38 per cent of the area converted 
from agriculture to forestry in Gansu Province was on low 
slopes, and hence at little risk of causing erosion (the same 
applied to 10 per cent of affected land in Shanxi and 11 per 
cent in Sichuan). Although these new forest areas may be 
of some benefit for biodiversity and landscape, it is doubtful 
that they would have much impact on sediments downstream 
(Bennett and Xu, 2008; Xu et al., 2004). Using treatment 
analysis, Xu et al. (2010) demonstrate that increasing local 
autonomy could lead to better local targeting, more cost-
effective programmes and improved outcomes. 
Landowners involved in schemes in Norway and Finland 
determine the supply of potential targets, and some voluntary 
conservation contracts have been criticised for lack of 
targeting as they can result in a conservation network that 
does not cover all the focal ecological characteristics (Barton, 
2010).	Although	early	analysis	of	Natural	Values	Trading	in	
Finland shows that the programme is meeting its ecological 
goals, it is still too early to assess its long-term ecological 
effects (Juutinen et al., 2009). 
The first-come-first-served approach initially used in national 
schemes in Costa Rica and Mexico was notorious for its 
minimal impact on at-risk lands. Most of the area covered 
by protection contracts in Costa Rica’s Osa Peninsula is 
forestland that may not be in direct danger of conversion 
due to its isolated and inaccessible location (Sierra and 
Russman, 2006). Analysis by Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. (2007) 
found that there was no significant difference in deforestation 
rates from 1997 to 2000 in areas covered by the national 
PSA scheme and those that were not, although this can be 
debated given the low rates of deforestation in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Barton et al. (2009) showed that efficiency 
levels improved in the next phase of PES in Costa Rica due 
to better targeting in the period between 1999 and 2001. 
Nevertheless, the continued lack of focus on areas at greatest 
risk from deforestation is reflected in the programme’s 
negligible impact on deforestation (Robalino et al., 2008; 
Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007).
Mexico has gone through several stages in terms of 
targeting criteria. Contracts were initially distributed on 
an ad-hoc basis, and much of the land concerned was at 
little risk of being converted because of its low opportunity 
costs. A spatial model created by Munoz-Piña et al. (2005) 
showed that in 2003 only 11 per cent of the land covered 
by the scheme was classified as being at high or very high 
risk from deforestation, although this increased to 28 per 
cent in 2004. The introduction of priority eligibility criteria 
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increased the focus on protecting forests in aquifers and 
areas affected by water scarcity, risk of flooding and other 
disasters associated with extreme weather. A combination 
of environmental, administrative and social eligibility criteria 
is now in place (rising from nine in 2006 to 26 by 2010), but 
secondary criteria are given more weight than primary criteria, 
and only one third of the land covered by the scheme is at 
significant risk from deforestation. Non-environmental criteria 
are increasingly hampering the programme’s ability to be 
environmentally effective (Alix-Garcia et al., 2005a; Muñoz-
Piña et al., 2008; Muñoz-Piña et al., 2011). 
The national Socio-Bosque PES programme in Ecuador 
shows that some lessons have been learned from Costa 
Rica and Mexico, as it includes the risk of deforestation as a 
criterion for participation, along with local poverty levels and 
the proportion of forest in protected areas. 
On the whole, national programmes in Costa Rica, Mexico 
and China have not been very successful in targeting more 
at-risk land (Alix-Garcia et al., 2005b; Alix-Garcia et al., 2010; 
Bennett and Xu, 2008; Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007). Their 
additionality is significantly reduced by concentrating on 
conserving low-risk forests, as all the payments in Mexico 
and a very large proportion of those in Costa Rica are for 
conservation. There are many reasons for this, including 
political interests, pressure from various groups and the 
governments’ tendency to ‘learn on the job’. However, a new 
generation of programmes that take more serious account 
of risk is emerging, due to increasing demand from farmers, 
tighter funding and pressure from academic groups that 
have identified and publicised various inefficiencies. Mexico 
is moving from an ad-hoc to a more risk-based approach to 
contracts. It remains to be seen whether existing levels of 
payment will be enough to attract farmers in targeted areas, or 
whether a system of differentiated payments will be required 
– as in Costa Rica, which has introduced higher payments for 
hydrologically sensitive areas that are usually located near city 
centres and have higher opportunity costs. 
3.4 Monitoring unintended impacts 
As with other projects, PES schemes can have unintended 
impacts. For example, leakage (or slippage) may occur when 
the efforts of PES or conservation schemes are offset by 
degradation in other areas managed by members of the 
scheme. This is usually associated with the extension of 
cropland outside areas covered by the PES scheme while 
land within the scheme is managed according to programme 
specifications (Claassen et al., 2008; Hoffman, 2009). It is 
less of an issue in local PWS schemes that target specific 
catchments for participation, and potentially more of a problem 
in bigger schemes, which are often government-funded 
(Ross et al., 2006). Because of the largely unknown nature 
of inter-basin dynamics, one cannot assume that degradation 
caused by leakage outside the project area will not affect the 
hydrology within it. 
Perverse incentives are another unintended consequence 
of PES schemes: people have been known to intentionally 
degrade land in order to receive compensation for restoration 
efforts specified by a PES programme, or stop restoration 
work so that they receive payments (Wunder and Albán, 
2008). 
The high cost of monitoring impacts within programme sites 
means that leakage is often only mentioned in passing, if 
at all. There is much to be learned from the way that this 
issue is treated in developing carbon markets, and there 
are approved methodologies for quantifying these impacts 
(see,	for	example,	the	Voluntary	Carbon	Standard,	VCS).	The	
FAO has developed an ex-ante strategy whereby monitoring 
mechanisms are designed to identify perverse incentives in 
order to determine the potential impact of their effects and the 
likelihood of their occurrence (FAO/REDLACH, 2004).
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4. Conclusions
As the levering capacity to demand payments for better 
watershed management increases, so does the need to 
demonstrate the impact of such activities. Interest in market-
based solutions like payments for watershed services 
continues to grow, in many cases complementing national or 
local regulations designed to raise funds (targeting service 
users) and restrict damaging practices (targeting service 
providers). 
There is a fine line between obtaining enough scientific 
information to develop and monitor a project and ensuring 
that it remains cost-effective as costs increase. By definition, 
the attractiveness of PWS schemes relies on their ability to 
create incentives to change behaviour, and on such changes 
generating net positive impacts on the level of watershed 
services. 
This article discusses the monitoring and evaluation criteria 
behind compliance or transactional monitoring, which ensures 
that contracts are followed, and effectiveness conditionality, 
which looks at how a scheme has managed to achieve 
its environmental objectives regardless of the degree of 
compliance. Although the two are usually linked, a high degree 
of compliance does not necessarily ensure that a scheme is 
effective, as a poorly designed scheme may target the wrong 
land managers and land that is at least risk, meaning that the 
payments may not generate the desired hydro-ecological or 
conservation benefits. 
 At the moment most schemes in low- and middle-income 
countries focus on monitoring contract compliance, which 
could usually be improved. Inadequate funding, lack of 
institutional capacity and capabilities (often due to staff 
shortages) and poor communication between stakeholders, 
intermediaries and regulatory officials all serve to undermine 
compliance monitoring and enforcement. Although increasing 
monitoring does generate higher transaction costs, it 
can ultimately help determine whether PWS is a credible 
instrument that delivers more than ancillary benefits for local 
communities and corporate responsibility for buyers. 
Demonstrating environmental additionality involves much 
more than having a prior record measuring the desired 
hydrological variable. It is also necessary to understand the 
relationship between the action and that variable – which can 
create further obstacles even where baseline data on water 
quantity or quality do exist – and remember that a lack of 
evident outcomes may be linked to external factors other than 
programme design. 
The key issue here is attribution: understanding whether 
factors other than the target actions affect water quality 
and quantity over time, and how they do so. This implies 
the ability to consult data on potentially confounding drivers 
as well as on the principle action concerned, and a sound 
theory of change behind the scheme. While it can be quite 
difficult and time-consuming, failure to take this crucial step 
may lead to faulty conclusions about cause and effect, with 
PWS programmes deemed successful when they actually 
had little or no impact on watershed services. If no baseline 
information is available and no cause and effect relationship is 
established, actors will have to rely on scientific extrapolation 
or local knowledge to develop the PWS scheme, and it 
will be impossible for monitoring processes to make any 
meaningful links between cause and effect. All that can be 
done in such cases is to monitor contract compliance and 
the relevant hydrological variables. If hydrological conditions 
do not improve then it can be intuited that the PWS scheme 
is not having the degree of effect anticipated, but it will 
be impossible to establish why this is so and whether the 
situation might have been worse without the introduction of 
the scheme.  If conditions do improve, the only conclusion 
that can be drawn is that the PWS scheme has probably not 
adversely affected the situation. There will be no proof that the 
improvement is due to the PWS scheme.
Better understanding of these relationships is vital for the 
long-term health of existing initiatives. The growing interest in 
such schemes shows that participants believe in the principle 
of land management, and the emergence of better-designed 
schemes that rely on a more scientific approach is grounds for 
cautious optimism about the potential of PWS. Nevertheless, 
evidence of impact will be required to ensure that actions 
really do generate added value, and to make the case for 
continued promotion of these schemes. 
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Annexes
Annex 1: Monitoring and impacts in existing PWS schemes
Case Extent Design and monitoring Reported results
Australia, Hunter River 
Salinity Trading, New 
South Wales
Local output-
based scheme
(NSW, 2009)
Point source dischargers trade 
credits in order to maintain a 
maximum salinity level of 900 EC 
(electrical conductivity) units. The 
scheme monitors and caps the 
discharges of 23 coalmining and 
power generation facilities, which 
hold a total of 1,000 salinity credits. 
During high flow conditions, each 
credit allows a discharger to release 
up to 0.1% of the Total Allowable 
Discharge or sell the credit to 
another participating facility through 
the scheme’s online trading platform. 
No discharges are allowed during 
low flow conditions, and discharges 
are unrestricted during flood 
conditions.
The service area covers a total of 2.2 
million hectares. The scheme achieved 
excellent results in 2008–2009. 
Salinity goals in the Upper Sector of 
the Hunter River were met at all times 
when discharges were allowed under 
the scheme.
Bolivia, Los Negros 
(Asquith et al., 2008a; 
Asquith	and	Vargas,	
2007; Le Tellier et al., 
2009)
Local input-
based initiative
Fundacion Natura implements an 
on-site monitoring programme for 
participating farmlands, which is 
conducted every 12 months by a 
Project Control Team. The team 
is composed of one upstream 
and one downstream community 
member, a Fundacion Natura field 
technician and the land owner. 
Monitoring reports are submitted to 
the enforcing agency that imposes 
final sanctions. Due to the lack of a 
hydrological baseline and sufficient 
monitoring data, the Fundacion 
Natura takes bi-weekly quantitative 
hydrological measurements in the 
watershed’s tributaries.
The scheme’s additionality has been 
questioned as the land concerned is 
not at highest risk of deforestation, 
and has not been rigorously 
measured. A hydrological study found 
no relationship between forest cover 
and streamflow.
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Case Extent Design and monitoring Reported results
China
(Bennett and Xu, 2008; 
Sun and Chen, 2006; 
Xu et al., 2010; Xu et al., 
2004).
Forest Ecological 
Compensation
Sloping Land Conversion 
Programme (SLCP)
Conversion of Cropland 
to Forest Programme 
(CCFP)
National 
input-based 
schemes
National government programme 
in which farmers must set aside 
erosion-prone farmland in critical 
areas of the watersheds of 
China’s main rivers. Monitoring is 
conducted at the local level by local 
governments.
The reported figures on plantations 
are staggering – a total plantation 
area of 53 million hectares, with 
28 million ha of plantations created 
in 6 years, 8.8 million ha of crops 
converted to plantations, and soil 
erosion reduced by 4.1 million ha 
– but some studies on the SLCP 
suggest low survival rates and 
insufficient monitoring, indicating that 
the programme may slip into a one-
off transfer to participants, with few 
substantive environmental outcomes. 
There is no information on its impact 
on water flows.
Colombia,	Cauca	Valley	
(Echavarria et al., 2003; 
Kosoy et al., 2005)
Local 
input-based 
schemes
Land use is monitored by water 
associations.
Land use is continuously monitored, 
but no studies have been made of 
water flows. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that Desbaratado River 
levels between 1988 and 1998 
did not match previous extreme 
flooding incidents, and that there 
were improvements in dry-season 
flows for the Nima and Amaime 
watersheds. However, these data are 
limited, and the absence of concrete 
figures makes it difficult to assess the 
actual hydrological impacts of project 
interventions  (Echavarria 2004). 
According to Kosoy, et al. (2005), 
long-term trends for annual rainfalls 
and irregular fluctuations are due 
to large-scale geographical causes 
rather than the status of local forests.
Costa Rica, La 
Esperanza 
(Rojas and Aylward, 
2003b; Porras, 2010b)
Local input-
based scheme
Baseline established using 
extrapolated data from other 
local watersheds. No monitoring 
processes have been implemented, 
although changes in water quantity 
are estimated according to the 
amount of hydro-electricity produced.
Land where payments are made is 
protected by a private reserve. There 
have been no change in land use, 
and no changes in water flows are 
expected.
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Case Extent Design and monitoring Reported results
Costa Rica, PSA 
Programme 
(Arriagada et al., 
2010; Blackman and 
Woodward, 2010; 
Porras, 2010; Sánchez-
Azofeifa et al., 2007)
National 
input-based 
programme
Hydrological sensitivity priority 
criteria for contract allocation (1 
of 7 criteria) and higher payments 
per hectare (US$400/ha/5 years 
compared with US$320/ha/5 years 
for regular protection). Monitoring 
includes observation of potential 
changes to land use through a 
combination of visual inspections and 
satellite pictures. Non-compliance 
is punished by the withdrawal of 
payments, and in extreme cases 
through civil legal action.
Payments are demand-led, and 
mostly for conservation. Compliance 
on forest cover has been observed, 
and effectiveness is increasing as the 
programme moves from a first-come-
first-served to a targeted approach. 
However, there are no studies of its 
impacts on watershed services.
By February 2010 the programme 
covered nearly 730,000 hectares of 
forest, and had planted nearly 3 million 
trees in agroforestry plantations. Lack 
of targeting has resulted in modest 
to minimum impact on deforestation. 
Studies of cloud forests show modest 
impact on water budgets.
Ecuador, Cuenca 
(Crespo et al., 2009; 
Echavarria et al., 2004; 
Stanton et al., 2010)
Local input-
based initiative
The Macua Project was started 
in 2002 by the University of 
Cuenca, Ecuador, to compile 
land and hydrological data on 
the four watersheds that feed the 
town of Cuenca. Project activities 
included installing network-
linked meteorological monitoring 
equipment, assessing the demand 
(designated) and supply (availability) 
of water in the watersheds, and 
conducting water quality and 
soil studies. Data collected for 
this project provide the ETAPA 
(Cuenca’s municipal water utility) 
with well-established baseline 
data and the ability to continuously 
monitor implementation of future 
PWS programmes in the Yanuncay 
watershed.
Hydrological studies of the wet 
Andean páramo ecosystem in nearby 
areas show links between land use 
and water: 1) pine plantations reduce 
annual water yield due to increased 
evapotranspiration; 2) livestock 
grazing does not seem to affect the 
hydrological response owing to low 
herd densities; 3) cultivation mainly 
affects regulation by increasing the 
magnitude of peak flows and reducing 
base flows (Crespo et al., 2009).
Ecuador, Fonag 
(Cannon et al., 2010; 
Echavarria et al., 2004; 
Southgate and Wunder, 
2007)
Local input-
based initiative
This programme does not monitor 
or evaluate conditionality. Payments 
from users of watershed services are 
directed to conventional conservation 
projects (Southgate and Wunder, 
2007). So far FONAG has managed 
fairly sophisticated weather stations 
and soil moisture monitoring stations 
that have been installed and are 
working properly (Cannon et al., 
2010).
The programme was managing over 
65,000 ha by 2008; however, the 
plantations are still too young to 
estimate their impact. Understanding 
of the water budget in the watersheds 
concerned is very basic, and almost 
nothing is known about how they 
might be affected by changes in land-
use activities. The effects are likely to 
be small because (i) threshold levels 
are very low - about 2.5% of all areas 
are reforested; and (ii) farmers living 
upstream may use the additional flows 
for their own purposes (Cannon et al., 
2010).
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Case Extent Design and monitoring Reported results
France,	Vittel
(Perrot-Maitre, 2006; 
Wunder, 2008)
Private output- 
and input-
based local 
scheme
Water quality is monitored 
extensively (300 tests per day) due 
to the strict regulations covering 
products marketed as natural 
spring water. In addition to in-house 
monitoring, the Institut National de 
la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) 
conducts compliance monitoring 
at 17 participating farm sites, and 
INRA and Agrivair (the intermediary 
developed	by	Vittel	to	negotiate	
and implement the PWS scheme) 
monitor compliance of farming 
practices on participating land.
The monitoring practices that have 
been	incorporated	into	the	Vittel	
scheme have generated clear and 
measurable improvements in water 
quality.
Honduras,  Jesus de 
Otoro 
(Kosoy et al., 2005)
Local input-
based scheme 
supported by 
PASOLAC
The water authority has been 
monitoring water quality since 
1999. Base studies included basic 
hydrological information, topography, 
precipitation, soil types, etc., but no 
direct measurement of sediments.
Monitoring shows some ‘improvement’ 
since the introduction of PWS. 
However, the small scale of this pilot 
PWS scheme and lack of knowledge 
about underground water movements 
mean that it is unlikely to be the main 
reason for this improvement, which 
can also be linked to the chlorine 
used to treat water. Fieldwork for an 
independent study (Jesus de Otoro, 
Puerto Barrios and San Pedro Norte) 
showed that none of the case studies 
can confidently demonstrate that the 
environmental service is provided, or 
identify the threshold areas required to 
reach specific quality targets.
Honduras, Campamento 
(Ardón and Barrantes, 
2003; Kosoy et al., 
2005)
input-based 
local initiative 
(no cash 
payments 
made yet)
No baseline studies have been 
conducted. Changes in land use 
are monitored, but changes in water 
quality and quantity are not.
A perceived reduction in pollution 
from coffee-processing wastes was 
reported in 2003. However, it was 
suggested that this had more to do 
with falling coffee prices and levels 
of activity, and that pollution would 
increase again as coffee prices 
recovered.
Honduras, El Copan 
(Alpizar et al., 2007; 
Villanueva	et al., 2008)
Local input-
based scheme 
(proposed)
Highly detailed farm-level 
management plans at have been 
designed to improve productivity, 
with payments based on existing land 
use and required activities. Work 
is targeted in areas with important 
users downstream (high-benefit) and 
where drainage has maximum impact 
(high-risk). A baseline has been 
developed for current land uses, 
which are given points according 
to their perceived benefits (primary 
forest with surveillance ranks the 
highest).
It is too early to assess the results 
of this new initiative, which builds 
on lessons from previous studies 
(especially Silvopastoril).
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Case Extent Design and monitoring Reported results
Indonesia, Sumberjaya
(Harto Widodo et al., 
2006; Suyanto, 2010)
Local input-
based scheme 
supported 
by RUPES; 
also testing 
output-based 
measures 
(payments 
for reduced 
sediments). 
Builds on new 
law.
The scheme, which is supported 
by RUPES and builds on the 
new law, is testing output-based 
measures (payments for reduced 
sediments). The socio-economic 
baseline is established through rapid 
rural appraisals. Monitoring covers 
infrastructure, institutional aspects 
and actual sediment reduction in 
the river. Community groups learn 
how to capture and use sediments. 
A financial reward scheme provides 
some funds upfront and then pays 
additional specified amounts based 
on the effects achieved.
About 70% of the protection forest is 
covered by agreements (work on the 
remaining forest is in progress; only 
7% was covered in 2004). Practices 
like multi-storey coffee gardens are 
being implemented, and conditional 
land tenure is in place for 6,400 
farmers.
Mexico, Chiapas 
(including the El Triunfo 
and La Encrucijada 
Biosphere Reserves) 
(Stem, 2005)
Local input-
based initiative 
linked to the 
national PSAH 
Programme
Monitoring is input-oriented. It has 
been difficult to establish a link 
between output indicators and 
changes in higher-level watershed 
conservation targets.
Evidence is mostly anecdotal. It 
supports the positive perception 
of restoration, suggesting reduced 
sediment accumulation and lower heat 
levels, and positive effects on shrimp 
catches and the local fishing industry.
Mexico, Fidecoagua, 
Coatepec 
(Blanco and Rojo, 2005; 
Holwerda et al., 2010; 
Muñoz-Villers	et al., 
2010)
Local input-
based initiative 
linked to the 
national PSAH 
Programme
An initial baseline study to establish 
forest cover in properties was 
complemented by a literature review, 
but water quantity and quality have 
not been measured. PES is in place, 
along with direct purchase of plots 
for conservation. GIS images are 
used to monitor forest cover, also 
field visits and field supervision. 
The impact of cloud forests on 
water flows have been measured by 
Independent studies.
An increasing amount of land is 
covered by community payments 
(over 2,300 ha between 2003 and 
2010). There is a general perception 
of positive impacts on water quality 
due to less sediment, but no hard 
information on this. Hydrological 
studies conducted between 2002 and 
2007 show that the impact on flows 
is less than expected; also that the 
impact on secondary forest is similar 
to primary forests in terms of water at 
cloud levels.
Mexico, PSAH 
Programme
(Alix-Garcia et al., 2010; 
Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; 
Muñoz-Piña et al., 2011)
National 
input-based 
programme
Higher payments for cloud 
forests and forest at high risk of 
deforestation. Monitoring is based 
on changes in forest cover (GIS and 
satellite images). 
Only 20% of the 26 priority criteria 
are concerned with significant 
hydrological factors and risk of 
deforestation. Secondary criteria 
(administrative, social, etc.) divert 
funds from areas where they could be 
used more effectively.
The programme has resulted in a 
small but significant reduction in 
deforestation, but slippage effects can 
only be accounted for at the national 
level.
Annex 1: continued
  I 31
Annex 1
Case Extent Design and monitoring Reported results
Mexico,	Zapaliname	
(Canales, 2006; 
Lechuga, 2009)
Local input-
based initiative 
linked to the 
national PSAH 
Programme 
(protecting 
existing 
reserves)
No baseline study was conducted. 
Monitoring is done as part of the 
reserve’s regular activities.
Until 2009 only 14%of water users 
paid the voluntary fee. There is some 
monitoring of spring water quality, but 
the results are not available yet.
Mexico,	Procuenca,	(Valle	
del Bravo) 
(Manson, 2008; Porras et 
al., 2008)
Local input-
based initiative 
linked to the 
national PSAH 
Programme
Baseline studies have been 
conducted on the quantity and 
quality of water in rivers and dams. 
The scheme provides equipment 
and training for local stakeholder-
led hydrological assessments and 
monitoring.
Results indicate that water quality in 
forested areas receiving payments 
is good, but that it declines in lower 
areas of the watershed, suggesting 
potential problems with fish farms and 
domestic or industrial wastewater.
Nicaragua, Esteli
(Espinoza, undated; FAO, 
2010)
Local input-
based scheme 
supported by 
PASOLAC, 
which uses 
in-kind 
downstream 
payments in 
the form of 
labour.
Patchy hydrological baseline 
study provides average monthly 
precipitation and a rough description 
of the catchment area. No attempt 
has been made to differentiate 
seasonality from land use, and there 
are no plans for monitoring.
The project has not been able to start 
collecting fees due to the lack of a 
legal framework. The use of municipal 
ordenanza has not been enough to 
ensure that users make the requisite 
payments. The funds collected by 
2010 were barely enough to cover the 
cost of their collection (FAO, 2010).
Nicaragua, San Pedro 
del Norte 
(Obando, 2007)
Local input-
based scheme 
supported by 
PASOLAC 
(includes 
building dykes 
and water 
retention 
units).
Basic feasibility studies identify 
the main hydrological variables 
(precipitation, soils, etc.), but no 
in-depth hydrological study has 
been made of the area. The local 
municipality has some records of 
water before the initiative took place.
Reports indicate that water sources 
improved after implementation of 
best management plans began in 
2004, with seasonal water sources 
becoming permanent and significant 
increases in total water flows. Some 
of this extra water is used on farms, 
and greater availability downstream 
has helped increase water supply from 
14% to 32% of total demand. The 
impact of the scheme may increase if 
there is sufficient funding to include 
more farmers, as it currently pays only 
5 of the 43 farmers in the catchment 
area.
Annex 1: continued
sustainable markets  i  mOnitOrinG PaYments FOr WatersHeD serViCes sCHemes in DeVelOPinG COuntries
32 I 
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South Africa, Working for 
Water programme 
(DWAF, 2006; Le Maitre 
et al., 2000; Swallow et 
al., 2009; Swallow et al., 
2007; Turpie et al., 2008)
National input-
based scheme 
focusing on 
the removal of 
invasive alien 
plants that 
consume large 
quantities of 
water (number 
of trees).
The monitoring programme is 
based on extensive studies of 
water consumption by non-native 
or invasive plant species. The 
baseline developed for the Working 
for Water programme relies on 
reduced streamflows associated 
with vegetation type and distribution. 
GIS-linked monitoring of the removal 
of invasive species (10,000 km²) is 
used to examine additionality.
Intensive modelling used to estimate 
the impacts of this programme on 
water flow puts it at 48–56 million 
cubic metres of additional water per 
annum.
The Philippines, Maasin 
(Salas, 2004)
Input-based 
programme
This long-term, government-led 
watershed management programme 
focuses on social forestry as a means 
of improving watershed management. 
It involves training and management 
for large-scale tree planting. Farmers 
were required to move from some 
parts of the watershed.
Severe reductions in water volume 
and significant siltation were reported 
following reforestation activities with 
fast-growing exotic species (mainly 
mahogany and gmelina). There were 
claims that reduced flows were 
caused by higher water outtakes by a 
local utility, and increased silt due to 
tilling by relocated farmers, but there 
are no studies supporting either side, 
and ‘the arguments ended when the 
rains began’ (Salas, 2004).
United States, 
Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP)
National input-
based scheme 
(Claassen et 
al., 2008)
This programme has developed 
and implemented a highly effective 
targeting process. Eligibility 
is dependent on land and soil 
conditions and the resulting 
contribution to ecosystem 
improvement. Assessment of these 
conditions is dependent on the 
CRP’s Environmental Benefits 
Index (EBI), which assesses various 
environmental concerns relative 
to the cost of enrolling land in the 
programme. The CRP’s target-based 
effectiveness is increased through 
a reverse auction process in which 
service providers bid against others 
to participate in the programme. 
Additionality is determined by 
comparing programme-specific 
changes in land management with 
changes that it is assumed would 
occur without the programme.
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Annex 1
Case Extent Design and monitoring Reported results
United States, Castskills, 
New York
Local 
output-based 
municipal 
scheme 
(Appleton, 
2002)
Combines land easements and 
acquisitions with tailored pollution 
control measures for each farm, to 
maximise effectiveness and minimise 
costs and ensure benefits for 
farmers.
Benefits often take the form of time 
and ease of labour (manure disposal, 
etc.) rather than cash. Some 93% of 
all farms in the NY City watershed 
were participating in the programme 
within 5 years of its creation, and it 
is hailed as the most successful non-
point pollution control in the United 
States.
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Additionality Environmental additionality is the net positive impact on the provision of ecosystem services compared 
with the baseline scenario or a hypothetical situation where no scheme is in place (Pascual et al., 
2009). In other words, it is the change in land use generated by the payment, which can be compared 
with what would have happened without the programme (‘business as usual’, see Wunder et al., 2008). 
Additionality can be measured in terms of contracts (input-based) and/or ecosystem services (output-
based).
Compliance This refers to the degree to which recipients of payments for environmental services (PES) comply with 
their contracts. It requires appropriate monitoring.
Cost-
effectiveness
The costs and outcomes of interventions are compared to assess the extent to which they can be 
regarded as providing value for money, and to inform decision-makers who have to determine where 
to allocate limited resources. Conservation policies are considered more cost-effective if they produce 
higher conservation outcomes for the same total cost as other policies, or equal outcomes at less cost 
than other policies (Wätzold et al., 2010).
Effectiveness Environmental effectiveness refers to the degree to which a policy (in this case, PWS) outperforms 
alternative policies (such as national parks) in achieving specific environmental goals. The way that 
effectiveness is measured depends on how the outcomes are defined; whether it is in terms of a 
specific land use such as forest cover, or the level of environmental service.
Efficiency Efficiency is the difference between the gross welfare effects of a scheme on the target population 
and the total costs incurred (Pascual et al., 2009). In PES, it is determined by the extent to which 
incremental ecosystem services are provided and the opportunity, implementation and transaction 
costs of their provision (Wunder et al., 2008). Transaction costs can be lowered by using flat payments 
and light monitoring, but this may affect the effectiveness of a scheme. Efficiency can be measured 
in different ways, such as looking at the amount paid for each hectare at risk of deforestation and the 
number of hectares of land at risk (see, for example, Alix-Garcia et al., 2005a).
Input-based, 
output-based
Input-based schemes work on the assumption that a given land-based activity will deliver environmental 
services. Output-based schemes try to measure the actual environmental services provided.
Leakage (spillage) Leakage refers to the displacement of the environmentally damaging land uses that the PES programme 
aims to replace (Wunder et al., 2008).
Permanance If the desired changes in land use or level of ecosystem services occur on a long-term basis they are 
deemed to be ‘permanent’.
Targeting In PWS targeting refers to a process where the programme administrator moves beyond the self-
selecting nature of voluntary participation in PES programmes and areas that add relatively little to 
the provision of environmental services, to areas previously determined as more important. It mainly 
focuses on (i) environmental benefits (gap analyses to identify high-benefit priority areas for biodiversity 
conservation); (ii) programme costs (a negative correlation between costs and biodiversity can lead to 
low-cost/high-benefit solutions) or (iii) benefit-to-cost ratios (Wünscher et al., 2008).
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Monitoring payments for watershed services schemes in 
developing countries
Payments for watershed services (PWS) are schemes that use funds from water users (including 
governments) as an incentive for landholders to improve their land management practices. They are 
increasingly seen as a viable policy alternative to watershed management issues, and a means of 
addressing chronic problems such as declining water flows, deteriorating water quality and flooding. 
In some places, local governments, donor agencies and NGOs are actively trying to upscale and 
replicate PWS schemes across the area. While their apparent success and progress in launching 
new initiatives is encouraging, there is still much to be learned from formative experiences in this field, 
especially with regard to monitoring and evaluation.
In this paper  we discuss the monitoring and evaluation criteria behind compliance or transactional 
monitoring, which ensures that contracts are followed, and effectiveness conditionality, which looks 
at how schemes manage to achieve their environmental objectives regardless of the degree of 
compliance. Although the two are usually linked, a high degree of compliance does not necessarily 
ensure that a scheme is effective. This is because a poorly designed scheme may target the wrong 
land managers and land that is at least risk, meaning that payments do not generate the desired 
hydro-ecological or conservation benefits. As the levering capacity to demand payments for better 
watershed management increases, so does the need to understand the dynamics of such activities 
and demonstrate their impacts. While the growing interest in such schemes shows that participants 
believe in the principle of land management, evidence of their impact is needed to determine which 
initiatives genuinely add value and are worth pursuing. 
The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) is a policy and action research organisation 
working to promote sustainable development—development that improves livelihoods in ways that protect the 
environments on which these are built. Based in London and working on five continents, we specialise in linking 
local priorities to global challenges. In Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and the Pacific, we work with 
some of the world’s most vulnerable people to ensure they have a say in the decision-making arenas that most 
directly affect them — from village councils to international conventions.
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